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Recent EU State Aid Judgments Offer Mixed Results
by Jacques Derenne and Dimitris Vallindas
In two eagerly awaited judgments issued on 
September 24 — Netherlands v. Commission, T-760/
15 and T-636/16, and Luxembourg v. Commission, T-
755/15 and T-759/15 — the General Court of the 
European Union (GCEU) confirmed the European 
Commission’s jurisdiction to assess, under state 
aid rules, tax rulings granted by EU member states 
to multinationals.
In particular, the GCEU clarified that the 
arm’s-length principle as described by the 
commission in the contested decisions is a tool 
that allows it to check that intragroup transactions 
are remunerated as if they had been negotiated 
between independent companies. Nevertheless, 
the GCEU annulled Netherlands, highlighting the 
need for the commission to conduct a rigorous 
analysis. Specifically, the court found that the 
commission had erred in demonstrating that the 
beneficiary of the tax ruling, despite any 
methodological errors by the member state, 
effectively benefitted from a reduction of its 
normal tax burden.
The Crusade Against State Aid Rulings
Since 2013 the European Commission has 
been investigating, under EU state aid rules, tax 
rulings offered by EU member states to 
multinationals. The commission’s policy has 
drawn criticism for using the state aid rules to 
assess tax strategies commonly used by many 
companies.
EU state aid law is unique in the world: To 
protect EU market integration and avoid 
protectionist measures among member states, it 
provides for the ex ante control of member states 
granting economic advantages to enterprises 
(defined as “aid”). EU member states must notify 
the commission of such measures before 
implementation with the commission holding 
exclusive approval power. Any member state 
implementation before approval can be 
challenged before member state national courts. 
These courts are required to safeguard third 
parties’ subjective rights until the commission 
reaches a decision on their compatibility with EU 
rules. The EU courts (the GCEU and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union) adjudicate the 
legality of commission decisions.
This portion of EU competition law is 
addressed to the member states themselves. 
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Sheppard Mullin represents the private 
parties discussed in this article in certain U.S.-
related legal matters completely unrelated to 
their EU operations and the European 
Commission’s decisions.
In this article, the authors explore the 
significance of two September 24 General Court 
of the European Union judgments confirming 
the EU’s jurisdiction under state aid rules to 
review tax rulings granted to multinationals by 
EU member states.
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Unlike U.S. antitrust law, EU competition law 
includes competition rules addressed to member 
states, constraining their freedom to adopt 
measures that could distort competition.
EU state aid tax rulings have been making 
headlines across the EU since 2013, when the 
commission launched investigations into the tax 
ruling practices of several member states. This 
followed public allegations of favorable tax 
treatment for some multinationals (allegations 
that originated from the U.S. Senate). 
Furthermore, the LuxLeaks and Paradise Papers 
crises prompted the commission to request 
information from all member states.
The problem of state aid through tax rulings 
arises in part because EU tax legislation 
harmonization is blocked by the unanimity 
required to adopt EU taxation legislation. 
Member states are therefore pursuing a 
commercial war to attract investment. In parallel 
with many EU legislative initiatives to fight tax 
evasion, the commission launched a “crusade” 
against some forms of tax rulings, which it 
considers to be “outliers.”
To this end, the commission is creatively using 
EU state aid rules to maintain a level playing field 
among member states. Since 2015 it has ordered 
Ireland to recover €13 billion of state aid from 
Apple and issued decisions against the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the 
United Kingdom, ordering the recovery of an 
additional €2 billion. There are ongoing 
investigations against the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. These cases have concerned 
companies such as ENGIE, Amazon, IKEA, and 
Nike.
All commission decisions finding 
impermissible state aid have been challenged 
before the GCEU.
First Setbacks for the Commission
The commission suffered its first setback in 
November 2018, when the GCEU annulled its 
decision against a Belgian tax scheme for 39 
multinationals in Kingdom of Belgium and 
Magnetrol International v. Commission, T-131/16 
and T-263/16. The annulment was, however, 
based only on a technicality relating to the 
definition of an aid scheme. Because of its narrow 
holding, this case did not clarify the main issues 
raised by the state aid investigations into tax 
rulings:
• whether these rulings confer an 
“advantage” on the beneficiaries; and
• whether this advantage is “selective.”
These are the two conditions for a state 
measure to qualify as state aid under EU 
competition law. The commission has not given 
up its objections to the Belgian tax scheme, and in 
September opened new separate investigations 
into the 39 companies. The commission also 
lodged an appeal (C-337/19 P) of the annulment 
before the CJEU.
The September GCEU Judgments
On September 24 the GCEU delivered its first 
two judgments on the tax rulings granted by the 
Netherlands to Starbucks and by Luxembourg to 
Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe. Because of these 
rulings, the commission had ordered each 
member state concerned to recover up to €30 
million in back taxes. This was far less than in the 
Irish case involving Apple, which will be decided 
by the GCEU later this year or early 2020. The 
GCEU annulled the commission’s Netherlands 
decision and confirmed the Luxembourg 
decision.
These judgments will influence commission 
actions in the coming years over whether to open 
similar cases. Many EU member states have 
already tweaked their tax systems in response to 
commission actions, but the likelihood of 
numerous future cases remains. EU Competition 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has been 
nominated by European Commission President-
elect Ursula von der Leyen for a second term 
when the new commission takes office November 
1. Vestager has also been nominated to the 
position of executive vice-president coordinating 
the commission’s agenda for “A Europe Fit for the 
Digital Age.” If Vestager is reappointed, it is 
unlikely that the commission will change its focus 
in the digital taxation area.
Both tax rulings concern transfer pricing.
The Luxembourg case concerns a group 
structure providing treasury services and 
financing to group companies based in various 
EU member states, operating from Luxembourg. 
The tax ruling in question concerns a transfer 
pricing arrangement. The commission established 
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that the ruling endorsed a complex method not 
appropriate for the calculation of taxable 
profits in compliance with market conditions. It 
concluded that the ruling, which enables the 
group treasury services provider to determine its 
tax liability in Luxembourg on a yearly basis for a 
period of five years, constitutes state aid 
incompatible with the internal market.
The Dutch case concerns a Dutch company 
whose main function is to sublicense intellectual 
property rights in respect of which royalties are 
paid to a U.K.-based company. The commission 
decided that the royalty paid could not be 
justified and that the transfer pricing report did 
not describe the license agreement or the market 
value. Part of the taxable profits were therefore 
allegedly shifted to the U.K. company, which is 
not liable for corporate tax in either the United 
Kingdom or the Netherlands. The commission 
found that the advance pricing arrangement 
entered into between the Netherlands and the 
company, which enabled the latter to determine 
its corporate income tax liability annually in the 
Netherlands for 10 years, constituted state aid 
incompatible with the internal market.
In both cases, arguments advanced by the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, and followed up 
by the companies, focused on:
• the notion of advantage; and
• the notion of selectivity.
The Notion of Advantage
The member states argued that the 
commission erred in identifying a version of the 
arm’s-length principle particular to EU law. In 
both cases, the parties cited the complexity of 
using the arm’s-length principle to examine 
transfer prices. They argued that analysis should 
be carried out according to methods adapted to 
the facts of the case, especially the taxpayer’s 
situation. All parties suggested that there was a 
methodological error in determining whether the 
tax ruling at issue was an advantage, and that the 
transfer pricing assessment was not sufficient to 
prove the existence of an advantage.
In the alternative, and concerning recovery of 
the aid, Luxembourg and the Netherlands argued 
that the commission improperly interfered with 
member state fiscal autonomy because direct 
taxation falls within the exclusive competence of 
the member states.
In both cases, the GCEU makes clear that the 
arm’s-length principle as described is a tool that 
allows the commission to check that intragroup 
transactions are remunerated as if they had been 
negotiated between independent companies. 
Thus, in the light of Luxembourg and Dutch tax 
law, that tool may be used by the commission.
In both cases, the pricing of intragroup 
transactions was not determined under market 
conditions. However, in the Luxembourg case, the 
GCEU established that the commission was fully 
entitled to conclude that the tax ruling at issue 
conferred an advantage on the company because 
it resulted in a lowering of tax liability. In that 
specific case, the GCEU confirmed that the 
commission was entitled to identify the arm’s-
length principle as a criterion for assessing the 
existence of state aid.
In the Dutch case, the GCEU found that mere 
noncompliance with methodological 
requirements does not necessarily lead to a tax 
burden reduction. The commission did not justify 
its choice of the transactional net margin method 
instead of the comparable uncontrolled price 
method and did not demonstrate that the royalty 
was not in conformity with the arm’s-length 
principle. In consequence, the commission failed 
to demonstrate that an advantage was conferred.
The Notion of Selectivity
In both cases, member states argued that the 
commission did not use the correct reference 
system to demonstrate to the requisite legal 
standard that the requirement of selectivity was 
met. In their view, the commission erred in 
excluding Luxembourg administrative law and 
practice from the reference system and was wrong 
to identify the general Dutch system of corporate 
income tax as the relevant reference system for 
assessing selectivity. In both cases, the member 
states claimed that the commission committed 
errors of law and inconsistencies in the 
identification of the relevant reference system.
The GCEU concluded in the Luxembourg case 
that irrespective of the reference framework used 
(the general national system of corporate income 
tax), the commission established that the measure 
at issue was selective based on the usual three-
step analysis:
• the identification of the reference system;
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• the determination of whether the measure 
treats operators that are in a comparable 
legal and factual situation differently; and
• the justification of the measure by the nature 
of the general scheme of the system itself.
The GCEU agreed with the commission that 
the conditions required to find selectivity were 
met. In the Dutch case, the notion of selectivity 
was not discussed by the GCEU because the 
commission’s errors in relation to the notion of 
“advantage” were sufficient to annul the decision.
Takeaways
All U.S. multinationals with operations in 
Europe benefiting from tax rulings or other 
selective favorable tax provisions could be 
affected by the state aid investigation trend.
The commission could initiate a state aid 
investigation against any member state that has 
concluded tax rulings with one or more 
multinationals. Although perfectly legal, a tax 
ruling could be regarded by the commission, in 
some circumstances, as unlawful and 
incompatible aid. Such an investigation could 
result in an obligation for the member state 
concerned to recover the alleged advantage from 
the multinational.
Competitors could also lodge recovery, 
damages, and interim relief claims before the 
national courts against both the member state 
concerned and the multinational as an alleged aid 
beneficiary.
Any multinational that benefits from a tax 
ruling in the EU that allows, a priori legally, the 
avoidance of tax for any part of its non-U.S. 
earnings should have it assessed under EU state 
aid rules. This analysis is critical given that EU 
institutions and member states are looking at 
ways to capture tax from large, generally tech-
related multinational firms. Furthermore, the 
commission is examining more than 1,000 tax 
rulings from about 700 different multinationals.
U.S. multinationals should consider auditing 
their EU tax rulings in the light of EU state aid law 
to assess and mitigate any state aid risks. In 
addition to their usual tax advisers, they should 
seek specialized EU counsel on state aid law and 
consider appropriate remedies. 
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